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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, new and devastating cyber attacks amplify the 
need for robust cybersecurity practices. Preventing novel cyber 
attacks requires the invention of Intrusion Detection Systems 
(IDSs), which can identify previously unseen attacks. Many 
researchers have attempted to produce anomaly - based IDSs, 
however they are not yet able to detect malicious network traffic 
consistently enough to warrant implementation in real networks. 
Obviously, it remains a challenge for the security community to 
produce IDSs that are suitable for implementation in the real 
world. In this paper, we propose a new approach using a Deep 
Belief Network with a combination of supervised and 
unsupervised machine learning methods for port scanning attacks 
detection - the task of probing enterprise networks or Internet 
wide services, searching for vulnerabilities or ways to infiltrate IT 
assets. Our proposed approach will be tested with network 
security datasets and compared with previously existing methods. 
CCS Concepts 
Security and privacy → Intrusion/anomaly detection and 
malware mitigation →  Intrusion detection systems → 
Artificial immune systems 
Keywords 
Intrusion Detection, network scanning attacks, Deep Belief 
Network;  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Due to the large usage of computers and computer networks 
worldwide, computer networks security has become an 
international concern. Through various scanning techniques, an 
attacker will attempt to gain information about network 
configurations, server implementations, and potential 
vulnerabilities before launching more invasive exploits. Scanning  
techniques can be categorized into three main groups, namely, 
TCP, UDP, ICMP. The received response indicates port status and 
can be helpful in determining a hosts' operating system and other 
information relevant for launching a future attack. Elias in [3] 
presented a taxonomy on distributed cyber scanning detection 
techniques. The approaches are split into four categories, namely, 
statistical, algorithmic, mathematical and heuristical: 
Statistical Approaches: These distributed cyber scanning 
detection approaches include techniques such as statistical 
characterization (features) of data samples, extrapolation or 
interpolation of data based on some best-fit, error estimates of 
observations, or spectral analysis of a data model. 
 Algorithmic Approaches: These distributed cyber scanning 
detection approaches employ step-by-step procedures for 
calculations, data processing, and formal automated reasoning. 
Mathematical Approaches: These distributed cyber scanning 
detection approaches utilize mathematical models, finite state 
machines and other algebraic and geometric techniques to achieve 
their detection task. 
Heursitical Approaches: These distributed cyber scanning 
detection approaches utilize non-formal expert based analysis 
including, but not limited to, visualization techniques, filter-based 
heuristics, previous incident analysis, and multidisciplinary 
techniques. 
In recent times, many research groups around the world have 
applied artificial intelligence models and intelligent computing to 
IDSs, including network-scanning attacks detection [1,2,5]. In this 
paper, we will propose a method using Deep Belief Networks to 
process network data in order to detect the signatures of port 
scanning attacks. With the ability to efficiently analyze larger 
multidimensional data, we will be experimenting with the NSL-
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KDD and UNSW-NB15 datasets. Our proposed method 
outperforms previous machine learning methods. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we 
overview some port scanning techniques and recent studies for 
port scanning detection. In Section III, we explain our proposed 
method using Deep Belief Networks for network scanning attack 
detection. Experiments and results are shown in Section IV. In 
Section V, we conclude the paper and present our future work. 
2. OVERVIEW OF NETWORK SCANNING 
ATTACKS AND METHODS FOR 
DETECTION 
In this section we will introduce common network scanning 
techniques, presenting the principles of operation together with 
the strengths and weaknesses of each technique. Finally, we will 
provide a summary of some of the scanning techniques that have 
been investigated and used recently. 
2.1 Port Scanning Techniques 
1) Open Scan: Open Scan is the simples scanning technique [3]. 
This technique utilizes the TCP protocol and the SYN flag to 
detect TCP ports. When a closed port is targeted, the victim 
replies with a RST flag. On the other hand, when an open port is 
detected, the victim replies with an ACK flag. An advantage of 
this technique is that it can achieve its scan in a very simplistic 
way without requiring any other functionalities or privileges. This 
simple technique is easily detected by a firewall.  
2) Half-Open Scan: The Half-Open scan, commonly dubbed as 
the TCP SYN scan, is a common method for port identification 
that allows the scanner to gather information about open ports 
without completing the TCP handshake process. Since this scan 
technique never actually creates a TCP session, it is advantageous 
in two ways. First, it is not logged by destination applications. 
Second, it is less stressful to the application service because it 
does not force the application to initialize or for systems resources 
to be allocated. On the other hand, this method suffers from one 
disadvantage. Since there is a need to create new raw packets that 
do not completely abide by the TCP handshake, the half-open 
connection process requires some elevated systems privilege [5]. 
3) Stealth Scans: The aforementioned cyber scanning techniques 
only use the typical SYN flag to investigate open ports. Hence, 
they are easily detected and logged by IDSs. These techniques try 
to avoid filtering devices by employing certain sets of flags other 
than SYN to appear as legitimate traffic. All these techniques 
resort to inverse mapping to determine open ports. They are 
SYN— ACK Scan, IDLE Scan, Fin, Xmas Tree and Null Scans, 
ACK Scan, Windows Scan and TCP Fragmentation Scan. [5]. 
4) Sweep Scan: Sweep scans, which do not aim to identify active 
ports but rather identify active hosts. They are characterized as 
performing sweeps, since their purpose is to identify the status of 
as many hosts as possible instead of focusing on an individual 
host. They operate by generating any request that would prompt a 
remote stations response. They can be defined as cyber scanning 
facilitators because they pinpoint active hosts just before the 
actual scanning techniques of active hosts take place. They are 
ICMP Echo Request Scan, ICMP Timestamp v Address Mask 
Scans and TCP SYN Scan.[5] 
5) Miscellaneous Scans: cyber scanning insights by shedding 
light on scans that deal with various protocols. These include the 
FTP bounce, UDP, IP protocol and RPC scans. 
We have a detailed discussion of common network scanning 
techniques. These attack techniques are most commonly found in 
network security datasets that are introduced and used to detect 
network scanning attacks in this paper. 
2.2 Network Scanning Detection Methods 
In this section we will present some of the scanning detection 
techniques that have been proposed recently by some research 
groups. M. Vidhya in [1] used a feature extraction technique and a 
Support Vector Machine (SVM) to classify scan attacks. The 
author proposes a feature extraction method for the KDD99 
dataset using the Consistency Sybset Evaluation algorithm and the 
Best First method. The test results show that using SVM with 
finite datasets is more accurate with the original dataset. The 
authors achieved a fairly high error of 99.9185 % [1]. However, 
with the asymmetric data, other research groups often use the 
measure associated with the attack data.  
Authors in [2] present an IDS based on the Support Vector 
Machine (SVM). It uses evolutionary algorithms to optimize 
SVM parameters to improve accuracy during intrusion detection. 
The author of [4] has provided an AOCD (An Adaptive Outlier 
Based Scope-Based Scalarized Scan Detection Approach) solution 
for early detection of high-precision network scanning when 
tested with KDD99 datasets. In this work, they presented a 
solution for converting network traffic data into a format that 
filters and classifiers can operate. It is worth noting that the 
authors selected random samples in the database, thereby 
identifying the set of features for clustering detection used in early 
detection of network scanning techniques. The team tested on the 
real data collected from the Tezpur University Intrusion Detection 
System (TUIDS), which confirmed that the solution is capable of 
detecting cyber-attacks highly accurately.[4].  
3. DEEP BELIEF NETWORK 
In recent times, deep learning models have been applied 
successfully in many fields such as image recognition, speech 
processing, natural language processing and big data processing. 
In deep-learning models, DBN has been extensively researched 
and applied, performing well with complex identification and 
classification problems such as 3D object identification [9], 
speech recognition [10], arial image processing [11]. 
DBN is modeled on a multilayer neural network model based on 
the generative model, according to Hinton [12]. From complex 
structured data, DBN's network layers will generate output data 
where the correlation between the data of the same class is more 
clearly expressed. Differentiating the DBN from other neural 
network models is the two-phase training algorithm: the 
unrestricted training mode based on the Restricted Boltzmann 
Machine (RBM), and the refining phase is the process of 
supervised learning. RBM is a neural network with a hidden layer 
and a layer represented in Figure 1. 
The RBM, inherited from the Hopfield network model, uses the 
energy function to evaluate the configuration of the network, 
including the linkage between neurons, the neuronal freedom 
coefficient, the state of the neurons (initial value out of neurons) 
[13]. However, RBMs differ from Hopfield without the links 
between neurons in the same class, only having no direction 
between the hidden neurons and the neurons of the class. The 
energy function of the network in terms of parameters θ 
determined to be represented by equation 1. 
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Figure 1: Restricted Boltzmann Machine (RBM) 
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where, θ = (w,b,a) and     demonstrating the relationship 
between the neurons in the visible layer i and hidden layer j, (bi, 
aj   is the coefficient of freedom of these two neurons); V and H 
are the total number of neurons in the visible layer and the hidden 
layer. Through the energy function, the state probability 
distribution of the network is represented by the equation 2. 
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In case the network configuration is known θ, the probability of 
the visible layer v is: 
                   
         
           
                         (3) 
Considering the case that the RBM is binary, the values v, h only 
receive 0 or 1. Then, the probability that i-neuron of visible layer 
with activation state in the case that states of hidden layers are 
known h is determined by the equation 4. 
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vi only receive 0 or 1 so from formula E(v, h) we have: 
                                                                                            
 
   
 
                
 
    
 
    
 
                
 
    
 
       
      
 
    
     (5) 
Or 
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Here:  
               
According to Hinton [13], the network will be trained by updating 
wij with the formula (7).  
                                                      )             (7) 
Table I: Scanning attacks data in NSL-KDD 
Type of attacks Training Testing 
IPSweep 3599 141 
Nmap 1493 73 
PortSweep 2931 157 
Satan 3633 735 
Total: 11656 1106 
4. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
4.1 Description of using datasets. 
4.1.1 Dataset NSL-KDD:  
NSL-KDD is a widely used dataset of current IDSs [14]. The 
NSL-KDD is an improved dataset from the KDD99 dataset, which 
eliminates duplicate data, redundant data, training data and more 
experimental data. It has 41 features as in KDD99, collected and 
labeled from various test attacks. There are four types of attacks in 
the form of network scanning attacks that are labeled 
corresponding to attack techniques or tools that use scan detection 
nmap, ipsweep, portsweep and satan with the numbers are 
described in the Table I.  
4.1.2 Dataset UNSW-NB15:  
The KDD98, KDD99, NSL-KDD datasets have been in use for a 
long time, so many of the attack techniques used to generate data 
are obsolete, without updating existing attack techniques. The 
UNSW-NB15 dataset [15] has overcome this and is being used 
extensively in intrusion detection studies. This dataset was 
released in 2015 at the Cyber Range Lab in New South Wales. 
The attack data is generated automatically from the IXIA 
PerfectStorm system with many new attack techniques. Packets 
are captured, preprocessed and extracted into 49 features. There 
are a total of 175,341 instances in the training dataset and 82,332 
instances in the test dataset. The network scanning attack dataset 
in UNSW-NB15 is performed by various techniques as described 
in Section II of this paper. In the training dataset, there are 10491 
instances, while in the test dataset there are 3496 instances. 
4.2 Experimentation and evaluation of results. 
The DBN training program for network scanning attacks detection 
was built in Python using the TensorFlow library. The experiment 
was conducted on a 3.6GHz Intel Xeon PC with 16GB of RAM 
and a NVIDIA GTX 1060 GPU. The final configuration of the 
DBN was selected through experimental processes, and it has 2 
hidden layers, each with 256 nodes. The input vector of the 
network is dimensioned equal to the numbers of features of the 
datasets described above.  
Table II: Confusion Matrix - NSL-KDD 
 
  DBN-prediction 
  Attacks Normal 
Real data 
Attacks 1100 6 
Normal 263 9448 
 
Unsupervised training is done with the greedy algorithm [13], and 
the refined training phase using the back propagation algorithm. 
For the NSL-KDD datasets in addition to the described port scan 
scanners we used unlabeled data “normal” for training (67343 
instances) and test (9711 instances). With NSL-KDD, we tested 
two classifiers: the first is the binary classifier to determine 
whether the network scan is active. During training and testing, 
we labelled all probe data as “Probe”. The second classifier is 
trained to classify four types of scanning attacks in NSL-KDD. 
For the UNSW-NB15 dataset, because the scanning types are 
labelled together, we only apply a binary classification to 
determine whether the data is an attack or not. We also used 
the ’’normal” data to train and test the model. The results of the 
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classifiers are often evaluated through the Confusion Matrix and 
some of the measurements are based on Confusion Matrix. Figure 
2 describes how to calculate the confusion matrix for a binary 
classifier. 
 
 
Figure 2: Confusion Matrix of binary classiﬁers 
 
The following measures will be used to evaluate the performance 
of intrusion detection models. 
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4.3 Results and evaluation. 
Table II is a Confusion Matrix of network layer detection 
detectors using DBN for the NSL-KDD data. Table III compares 
the (TPR) and (FAR) of the proposed method with the results of 
several other methods presented in the articles [1], [4] and [16]. 
The results showed that the DBN detection rate was higher than 
other methods, while the false alarm rate was low. Table IV 
compares Accuracy (acc), Precision (n) and Recall (p) of DBN 
and other machine learning algorithms [17]. The results show that 
the DBN archives a more accurate classification of algorithms that 
have been applied previously. For the UNSW-NB15 datasets, as 
there are no experimental port-scanning attacks with this dataset, 
we compare the results of the DBN with two other powerful 
algorithms for data classification: SVM and RandomForest. Table 
V shows the results, which indicates that DBN classification 
results are better than compared algorithms. 
 
Table III. Comparison result of TPR and FAR-NSL-KDD 
Method TPR FAR 
SVM 0.93413 0.00016 
AOCD 0.98078 0.00667 
ANN-MLP 0.82610 0.02811 
DBN 0.99458 0.02708 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we present network scanning techniques and Deep 
Belief Network with a combination of supervised and 
unsupervised machine learning model for detecting network 
scanning attacks. Experiments with the NSL-KDD dataset and the 
UNSW-NB15 datasets showed that the DBN algorithm had high 
detection rates for network scanning, while ensuring a lower false 
alarm rate than the study results before. In the future, we will be 
experimenting with online data networks to test the algorithm’s 
ability to work in real-time intrusion detection systems. 
Table IV. Comparison results of 4 types of scanning 
attacks detections 
Method 
(%) 
Type of attack 
ipsweep nmap Port 
sweep 
satan 
Nave Bayes 
acc 93.89 
π 
 
97.09 97.86 75.54 90.33 
ρ 
 
93.91 93.53 95.86 93.97 
k-NN 
acc 91.73 
π 
 
85.74 93.22 84.09 100 
ρ 
 
100 99.89 51.03 77.87 
SVM 
acc 98.11 
π 
 
98.35 97.56 96.12 100 
ρ 
 
97.66 100 85.52 99.14 
Decision 
tree 
acc 99.50 
π 
 
99.76 99.77 96 100 
ρ 
 
98.59 100 99.31 99.43 
Random 
Forest 
acc 85.06 
π 
 
80.19 84.29 100 100 
ρ 
 
99.53 99.89 2.07 64.37 
MLP with 
features 
extraction 
acc 99.44 
π 
 
99.53 99.77 95.92 100 
ρ 
 
98.59 100 97.24 100 
DBN 
acc 99.64 
π 
 
99.29 100.00 99.36 99.73 
ρ 
 
100.00 98.65 99.36 99.73 
  
Table V: Comparison the results of TPR and FAR  
 UNSW – NB15 
Algorithms TPR FAR 
SVM 99.74 3.20 
Random Rorest 99.80 3.31 
DBN 99.86 2.76 
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